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ASBTRACT
This study empirically investigates the “relative tax gap hypothesis,” which posits that the greater the size of
the relative tax gap, the greater the degree to which the U.S. Treasury must borrow from domestic and/or
other credit markets and hence the higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on the Bellwether 30 year U.S.
Treasury bond. The study uses the most current data available for computing what is referred to here as the
“relative tax gap,” which is the ratio of the aggregate tax gap (the loss in federal income tax revenue resulting
from personal income tax evasion) to the GDP level. For each year of the study period, the nominal value of the
tax gap is scaled by the nominal GDP level and expressed as a percentage. The study period runs from 1982
through 2016, reflecting data availability for all of the variables. The estimation results provide strong support
for the hypothesis. In addition, in separate estimations, evidence is provided that the relative tax gap also acts
to elevate the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds. It logically
follows, then, that to the extent that a greater relative tax gap leads to higher ex ante real interest rates, it may
contribute to the crowding out of corporate investment in new plant equipment associated heretofore with
government budget deficits per se.

KEYWORDS
aggregate personal income tax evasion; the relative tax gap; ex ante real interest rate yield on the Bellwether
bond; Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds; reduced investment in new plant and equipment
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INTRODUCTION

In any nation having a personal income tax in place, personal income tax evasion consists largely of
taxable income that is either unreported or underreported by households to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) or to its counterpart government tax collection authority outside the U.S. Insofar as the U.S. is
concerned, personal income tax evasion can also consist of either spurious or inflated tax deductions or
fabricated exemptions or other misrepresentations on various IRS tax forms. Such IRS forms might
include Form 1040 itself or Form 1040-EZ and/or Form 1040 Schedules A, C, C-EZ, and E, among others
(Phillips, 2014). Scholarly research inquiries into the various dimensions of income tax evasion, especially
personal income tax evasion but to some degree corporate tax evasion as well, fall into a number of
distinct and rather broad categories.
One of the primary avenues of this tax evasion-related research is the essentially theoretical, largely
mathematical models of personal income tax evasion behavior, although corporate tax evasion behavior
is also addressed to a limited degree. Studies found in this string of the literature include works by Cebula
(1997), Sandmo (2005), and Richardson (2006). Some of these frameworks have in fact laid the
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groundwork for subsequent empirical research in one form or another regarding the identification of
factors that are determinants of (exert influence upon) income tax evasion.
Another, quite different, dimension of tax evasion studies involves endeavors that either conduct
experiments on personal income tax evasion/compliance behavior or, in a few cases, assume the form of
surveys and questionnaires. Included within this research grouping are a variety of works undertaken
using an array of different contexts, such as the relatively recent studies by Yalami and Gumus (2013),
Tarun and Jasmin (2013), Awan and Hannan (2014), Bayer and Sutter (2008), Obafemi (2014), and
Ameyaw, et al. (2015). Such studies are largely empirical in nature, deriving their data from the
experiments (or from the questionnaires and surveys) involved in the studies. On the one hand, certain
of these studies indicate an aversion to the prospect of being audited while, on the other hand, a number
of alternative studies reveal a lack of such risk-averse behavior. Still other of these scholarly papers find
that some portion of taxpayers may be averse to tax evasion on moral or ethical grounds, whereas certain
people are opposed to tax compliance due to secondary gains they receive from evasion. Moreover, some
studies find evidence that taxpayers use tax evasion as a means of expressing dis-satisfaction with
government policies and/or actions. Additionally, in several such studies, an increased incentive to evade
personal income taxation by underreporting income is attributed to higher marginal income tax rates, a
finding not by any means restricted to the U.S. (Chan, Troutman, and O'Bryan, 2000; Tarun and Jasmin,
2013; Obafemi, 2014; Awan and Hannan, 2014; and Ameyaw, et al., 2015).
The remaining broad categories of income tax evasion studies consist of those that largely or, in some
cases exclusively, adopt what may be referred to as "official data,” i.e., data secured from either the IRS
and/or from some other “official,” i.e., typically a central government agency or one form or another
of provincial government source, and/or from a recognized and acknowledged publicly available nongovernmental origin. Among the types of information thusly obtained and analyzed are data on
income tax evasion per se, unreported income, income tax rates, IRS audit rates, IRS penalties, income
detection technology, government deficits and/or debt, and indices expressly indicating dissatisfaction
with government.
This line of scholarly inquiry can be broken into at least two component parts. The first of these takes
the form of endeavors to quantify the magnitude or impacts of the aggregate degree of federal income
tax evasion in the macro-economy (Frey, Weck, and Pommerehne, 1982; Isachsen and Strom, 1985;
Bajada, 1999; Giles, 1999; Fisman and Wei, 2004; Ledbetter, 2004, 2007; Cebula, 2018, 2019; Gale and
Krupkin, 2019). The second component attempts to identify factors that influence the degree/extent of
aggregate federal personal income tax evasion or compliance (Kirchgaessner, 1983; Hill and Kabir, 1996;
Cebula, 1997, 2004; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Labton, 2000; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett,
2001; Fisman and Wei, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005); Richardson, 2006; Dell’Anno, 2007;
Engstrom and Holmlund, 2009; Cebula and Feige, 2012; Ariyo and Belcoe, 2012; Phillips, 2014; Ameyaw and
Dzaka, 2016; Chatzimichael, Kalaitzidakis, and Tzouvelekas, 2019). Some of these studies focus upon
individual tax returns, such as the relatively recent study by Phillips (2014), although most focus on more
aggregative data. However, despite the substantial breadth, diversity, and depth of this tax evasion
literature, to date no scholarly study has addressed the impact of the tax gap per se on the market for U.S.
Treasury debt issues.
On a somewhat related topic, over the last half century, the unified (total) federal budget has been
in a state of deficit in all but four years (see Table 1). Largely as a consequence of this circumstance, a
scholarly literature has been generated that focuses upon the interest rate yield effects of these
budget deficits, especially with respect to the yields on relatively longer-term Treasury debt issues1
__________________________________________________
1 Short-term issues would be typified by U.S. Treasury bills, whereas longer-term issues would include Treasury notes
(especially 10-year maturities), and Treasury bonds (especially, 30-year maturities).
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and longer-term corporate debt issues2 (Hoelscher, 1986; Zahid, 1988; Ostrosky, 1990; Swamy, Kolluri,
and Singamsetti, 1990; Cebula and Saltz, 1998; Gissey, 1999; Vamvoukas, 2002; Mukhtar and Zaharia,
2002; Aisen and Hauner, 2008; Kameda, 2014; Cebula, 2018). It is noteworthy that, however, none of the
published interest rate literature has explored the potential impact of the tax gap per se on interest
rate yields.
Table 1. The Total/Unified Federal Budget Deficit as Percentage of GDP, 1968-2016
Year
Deficit/GDP (%)
Year
Deficit/GDP (%)
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

2.8
-0.3
0.3
2.1
2.1
1.1
0.4
3.3
4.1
2.6
2.6
1.6
2.6
2.5
3.9
5.9
4.7
5.0
4.9
3.1
3.0
2.7
3.7
4.4

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

4.5
2.8
2.8
2.2
1.3
0.3
-0.8
-1.3
-2.3
-1.2
1.5
3.3
3.4
2.5
1.8
1.1
3.1
9.8
8.7
8.5
6.8
4.1
2.8
2.5
3.3

Source: Council of Economic Advisors (2018, Table B-18).

Accordingly, the objective of this study is to contribute to the bodies of scholarly literature on both
interest rates and income tax evasion by empirically investigating the impact of aggregate federal
personal income tax evasion in the form of the relative tax gap on the bellwether ex ante real interest
rate yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds. In order to measure the aggregate degree of federal
personal income tax evasion in a useful fashion, we adopt what is referred to here as the relative tax
gap, which is defined in this study as the “tax gap,” i.e., the value of the difference between actual
nominal Treasury tax collections and what those nominal tax collections would have been in the
absence of income tax evasion, relative to, i.e., scaled by, the nominal GDP level. The relative tax gap,
which is discussed in further detail in Section 2 of this study, is converted from decimal form and
expressed as a percentage. In this study, the fundamental hypothesis under investigation is that the
__________________________________________________
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Including yields on Moody’s Aaa-rated and Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds.
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larger the relative tax gap (taken here as the measure of aggregate personal federal income tax
evasion), the higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, ceteris paribus.
The study period runs from 1982 through 2016, which reflects the availability of the expected inflation
series available to permit the generation of the ex ante real interest rate series and the series needed
to compute the relative tax gap.
It is worth stressing that the relative tax gap is quite different from the AGI Gap. The latter is simply
an estimate of the degree to which households underreport their taxable income to the IRS and other
tax authorities (such as, within the U.S., state departments of revenue). Hence, the AGI Gap differs
from the tax gap in that AGI Gap is not the value of lost tax revenues/collections to the U.S. Treasury
resulting from personal tax evasion (Gale and Krupkin, 2019). Furthermore, in order to generate the
relative tax gap, the nominal tax gap is expressed in this study, unlike other studies, as a percent of
the nominal GDP level, whereas the AGI Gap found in other studies is expressed as the ratio of the
aggregate unreported adjusted gross income to the estimated actual aggregate adjusted gross
income.

THE RELATIVE TAX GAP AND THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
To begin the analysis, we provide a description of how the Tax Gap and Relative Tax Gap measures of
aggregate income tax evasion are computed. The construction of the Relative Tax Gap involves, most
fundamentally, the use of the AGI Gap, which (as noted above) is defined as the percentage of
aggregate adjusted gross income that is either unreported or underreported on personal income tax
returns submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). For computational purpose, the AGI Gap is
expressed as a decimal, AGIGAPDEC. The Relative Tax Gap construction also involves the aggregate
federal personal income tax (in current dollars) actually paid by households to the IRS, AFPINCTXPD.
Together, these data are used first to estimate the magnitude of the total (aggregate) federal personal
income tax liability of households (in current dollars) in the absence of tax evasion, AGGFPITL:
AGGFPITL = AFPINCTXPD/(1.00 – AGIGAPDEC).
The difference between the amount owed to the IRS in the absence of tax evasion and the amount
actually paid to the IRS is the nominal Tax Gap. In particular, the nominal Tax Gap, which is estimated
aggregate nominal unpaid federal personal income liabilities, is then computed, as follows: Tax Gap
= AGGFPITL – AFPINCTXPD. Finally, the Relative Tax Gap is the nominal Tax Gap scaled by, i.e., expressed
as a percentage of, nominal gross domestic product, GDP, so as to permit comparisons of the Tax Gap
over time: Relative Tax Gap = Tax Gap/GDP. This variable is the key variable of interest in this study. The
interested reader can find the relative tax gap values for each year of the study period in Table 2.

__________________________________________________
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Table 2. Relative Tax Gap, by Year, 1982-2016 Study Period*
Year
Relative Tax Gap
Year
1982
1.211862
1999
1983
1.188234
2000
1984
1.184111
2001
1985
1.122022
2002
1986
1.168484
2003
1987
1.034173
2004
1988
0.854023
2005
1989
0.984020
2006
1990
0.923881
2007
1991
0.886181
2008
1992
0.956774
2009
1993
1.073845
2010
1994
1.117190
2011
1995
1.087886
2012
1996
1.123419
2013
1997
1.086484
2014
1998
1.227838
2015
2016

Relative Tax Gap
1.137057
1.170243
1.264393
1.220207
1.159931
1.063993
1.230051
1.257119
1.106253
1.051318
0.849262
0.764936
1.023240
1.065787
1.126630
1.294455
1.287756
1.324740

* Sources: Ledbetter (2004, 2007), Foertsch (2016), Internal Revenue Service (2014), and the Council of Economic Advisors (2004;
2018).

Given this backdrop, we adopt the open-economy loanable funds model specification found in
Madura (2008, esp., pp. 24-32), modified in order to accommodate the relative tax gap. It is within this
context that the real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds is, assuming all other bond markets
are in equilibrium, determined by the following condition:
S + DEF/GDP = D + MB/GDP + NCI/GDP

(1)

where: S = the supply of 30-year Treasury bonds;
DEF/GDP = the total/unified federal budget deficit, expressed as a percentage of GDP;
D = the private sector demand for 30-year Treasury bonds;
MB/GDP = the monetary base, expressed as a percentage of GDP; and
NCI/GDP = net international financial capital inflows, expressed as a percent of GDP.
Following Madura (2008, esp. pp. 24-32), Hoelscher (1986), and Cebula (2018), while also integrating the
tax gap into the specification, it is hypothesized that:
D = D (EAR30, EAR3YR, EARTF, Y), DEAR30 > 0, DEAR3YR < 0, DEARTF < 0, DY < 0
S = S (EAR30, TAXGAP/GDP), SEAR30 < 0, STAXGAP/GDP > 0

(2)
(3)

where: EAR30 = the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds;
EAR3YR = the ex ante real interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes;
EARTF = the ex ante real interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds;
Y = the percentage growth rate in real GDP; and
TAXGAP/GDP = the relative tax gap, i.e., the ratio of lost nominal tax revenue to the coffers of the
U.S. Treasury resulting from personal income tax evasion to the GDP, expressed as a percent.
__________________________________________________
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Since the specification is expressed in terms of the ex ante real interest rate yield, this study required
a measure of expected future price inflation. Various such measures exist, including those derived from
the adaptive expectations and rational expectations models and from other analytical frameworks, as
well as from pure survey data (Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti, 1990). Model-based measures of
expected future inflation rates rely fundamentally on empirical estimations, within the context of which
both economic theory and statistical methods are combined and then applied to data. The latter data
typically include a variety of financial variables and inflation series, although other information can be
incorporated in accordance with the specified model.
On the other hand, survey-based measures of expected future inflation are directly obtained by
soliciting the views of respondents regarding the future inflation outlook. There are differences across
these surveys such as: the types/traits (such as age, educational attainment, gender, and income) of
people who are contacted for the survey; the forecast time horizon; the variables of concern in the
survey; and even in how the pertinent inflation expectations questions are posed. These considerations
can influence the interpretation, validity, and usefulness of the survey responses. For example, one wellknown series on expected future inflation, The Livingston Survey, a widely-used survey gathered for
many years by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, was found by Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti
(1990) to be fundamentally flawed in several ways in the study.
Based on the observations above, it can be reasonably argued that it may be useful to adopt
fundamentally model-based, as opposed to purely survey-based, data on expected future inflation.
Interestingly, since 1982, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) has reported estimates of the
average expected future inflation rates of the CPI in the U.S. in each year for the ensuing ten years.
These are calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland principally by using a model that
integrates various financial market data as well as survey-based data.3 Accordingly, the present study
adopts these calculated data as the measure of expected future price inflation, so that the ex ante real
interest rate yields adopted in this study are expressed in the form of the percentage nominal interest
rate minus this expected percentage future inflation rate.4
According to this framework, the private sector demand for 30-year Treasury bonds is modeled as
being an increasing function of EAR30 since bond buyers would logically prefer a higher real rate of return
on their investment, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, in theory, the Treasury (as the issuer of 30-year
Treasury bonds) would supply/issue fewer 30-year bonds to the financial marketplace in response to a
higher EAR30, ceteris paribus, this being because a higher value for EAR30 would imply elevated debt
service costs.
Next, the variable EAR3YR is included in this study as a measure of the yield on a shorter-term taxable,
high quality debt issue that would compete in the financial marketplace with 30-year Treasury bonds,
whereas the variable EARTF is included in the specification to represent the yield on a bond issue that is
fundamentally different from 30-year Treasuries insofar as its interest payments are exempt from federal
income taxation while also directly competing with 30-year Treasuries by virtue of its being both longerterm and of high quality. In any case, it is hypothesized that the higher the value of either EAR3YR or
EARTF, the greater the degree to which investors substitute either three-year Treasury notes or high
grade municipal bonds, respectively, for 30-year Treasury bonds in their portfolios and thereby reduce
their demand for the 30-year Treasuries, ceteris paribus. Clearly, then, the lower the demand for 30-year
bonds, the lower the 30-year bond price and hence the higher the 30-year bond yield. It is noteworthy
that as an alternative to the variable EAR3YR, three other shorter term ex ante real Treasury bill interest
__________________________________________________
3 The

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland expected future inflation data are based on data from Blue Chip, Bloomberg, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Federal Reserve Board, and Haver Analytics.
4 Related to the expected inflation series and ex ante real interest rate, see also the model developed by Haubrich, Pennacchi,
and Ritchken (2012).
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rate yields were considered, namely, those on the three-month Treasury bill, the six-month Treasury bill,
and the one-year Treasury bill. In all three cases, the variable in question introduced significant multicollinearity and hence each was discarded in favor of EAR3YR.5
During times of more rapid real GDP growth, the transactions demand for money is expected to rise
more rapidly (Madura, 2008, p. 31). The scenario would in turn be expected to lead to rising interest rates
in the financial markets and thereby to reduce the demand for 30-year government bonds, ceteris
paribus. This is because longer-term bonds carry a greater degree of “interest rate risk” during such
times. In other words, the higher the growth rate of real GDP, Y, the greater the demand for equities,
real estate, and other assets that appreciate in value rather than for 30-year bonds, which depreciate in
value during such times. Hence, the demand for these 30-year bonds is a decreasing function of Y, ceteris
paribus. In any case, the greater the value of Y, the lower the demand for these long-term Treasuries,
and consequently the lower their market price will be and the higher their real interest rate yield will be.
As Madura (2008, p. 32) observes, greater “…economic growth puts upward pressure on interest
rates…”
As summarized in the text above, the tax evasion measure is defined in this study as the relative tax
gap, TAXGAP/GDP. This variable is the nominal tax gap (the difference between actual nominal Treasury
income tax collections and what those nominal tax collections would have been in the absence of
personal income tax evasion in the form of underreporting of taxable income) expressed as a percent
of nominal GDP. Alternatively stated, (TAXGAP/GDP)t is the nominal tax gap in year t scaled by the
nominal GDP in year t and then converted to a percent. Measuring the tax gap in this fashion permits
judging the size of the tax gap relative to the size of the economy over time. As hypothesized in
equation (3) above, in this study, the greater the extent of federal personal income tax evasion thusly
measured, the greater the degree to which the Treasury must issue/supply new securities, including
issues such as 30-year Treasury bonds, and, accordingly, the lower the price and hence the higher the
real yield on those 30-year issues will be in the financial marketplace, ceteris paribus.
The aggregate domestic supply of loanable funds, which by its nature, can be available for the
purchase of myriad alternative financial investments (including 30-year Treasury bonds), can be reflected
in various ways. In this study, the aggregate domestic supply of loanable funds is treated as being
reflected in large part by the monetary base (MB), with the monetary base expressed by the ratio
(MB/GDP), i.e., expressed as a percent of GDP. This specification permits evaluation of the monetary base
relative to the size of the economy. Moreover, in the U.S., for the period December, 2008 through
October, 2014, the Federal Reserve engaged in three stages of “quantitative easing:” QE1, QE2, and QE3.
In turn, these forms of quantitative easing exercised a positive impact on the size of the monetary base;
therefore, adopting this variable as a measure of the availability of loanable funds, as opposed to, say,
the M2 money supply, possesses the advantage that it, in theory, measurably reflects the degree of
quantitative easing (Cebula, 2018). In any case, the greater the magnitude of the monetary base variable,
the greater the availability of loanable funds in the aggregate and hence the lower the real interest rate
(EAR30) should be, ceteris paribus (Madura, 2008, p. 34).
Net financial capital inflows (NCI) are also included in the model. Naturally, when there is a net inflow
of financial capital, the funds can be directed towards a wide variety of alternative investment options,
including if not especially those offered in the financial markets. More specifically, within the latter
context, net capital inflows may be used to purchase any of a variety of equities issues and/or bonds.
Thus, other things held constant, the greater the volume of NCI relative to GDP that is used to purchase
bonds in the U.S., the greater the downward pressure on interest rate yields in the economy’s financial
__________________________________________________

For example, if the ex ante real three-month Treasury bill yield were adopted in place of EAR3YR in the estimate, the
resulting VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) for this variable would be 41.08, far in excess of the maximum value of 10
recommended in most standard econometrics textbooks (e.g., Hair, et al,, 2006; Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2009).
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markets as a whole, including that for 30-year Treasury issues. Consequently, consistent with the
conventional wisdom (Madura, 2008, pp. 35-36), it is hypothesized that the ex ante real interest rate yield
on 30-year Treasury bonds is a decreasing function of (NCI/GDP), ceteris paribus.
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) and then proceeding to solve for EAR30 (after
including an interaction term for DEF/GDP and TAXGAP/GDP, namely, INTER) yields the model initially
underlying this study:
EAR30 = f (DEF/GDP, MB/GDP, NCI/GDP, EAR3YR, EARTF, Y, TAXGAP/GDP, INTER),
fDEF/GDP >0, fMB/GDP <0, fNCI/GDP <0, fEAR3YR >0, fEARTF >0, fY >0, fTAXGAP/GDP >0

(4)

The first of these hypothesized signs involves the federal budget deficit, expressed in this study as a
percentage of GDP. The hypothesized sign on fDEF/GDP is positive, which reflects the “conventional
wisdom” that when the Treasury attempts to finance a budget deficit (whether through the sale of bills,
notes, bonds, or other debt instruments), it forces market interest rate yields upwards as it competes for
funds in the financial markets (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Madura, 2008, esp. pp. 34-35; Ball, 2012). The
second and third signs for the variables shown in equation (4) reflect the conventional wisdom regarding
the impact of a greater availability of loanable funds, as reflected in either a relatively larger monetary
base or greater international capital inflows, respectively, each of which enables the financial markets to
absorb more government sector (as well as private sector) debt and thereby acts to diminish upward
pressure on interest rates (Madura, 2008, pp. 34-36). The next three hypothesized signs for the
explanatory variables expressed in equation (4) are predicated directly upon equations (2) and (3) and
the discussions thereof provided above. Finally, given the presence of income tax evasion and budget
deficits in the model, an interaction term (INTER) for these two variables was initially included in the
system, as follows:
INTER = DEF/GDP*TAXGAP/GDP

(5)

However, the coefficient on the interaction term was statistically insignificant across all estimations;
hence, it was omitted from the final estimations (Hair, et al, 2006; Wooldridge, 2009).

THE INITIAL EMPIRICAL MODEL
Based on (4), the initial model to be estimated in this study is provided by:
EAR30t = α0 + α1 (DEF/GDP)t + α2 (MB/GDP)t + α3 (NCI/GDP)t + α4 EAR3YRt + α5 EARTFt +
α6 Yt + α7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t + α8 AR(1) + Ɛt

(6)

where:
EAR30t = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds in year t, expressed as a
percent per annum;
α0 = constant term;
(DEF/GDP)t = the ratio of the unified /total nominal federal budget deficit to the nominal GDP in year t,
expressed as a percent;
(MB/GDP)t = the ratio of the nominal monetary base to the nominal GDP in year t, expressed as a percent;
(NCI/GDP)t = the ratio of the nominal value of net international financial capital inflows to the nominal
GDP level in year t, expressed as a percent;
__________________________________________________
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EAR3YRt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes in year t, expressed
as a percent per annum;
EARTFt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on high grade tax-exempt municipal bonds in year t,
expressed as a percent per annum;
Yt = percentage growth rate of real GDP during year t;
(TAXGAP/GDP)t = the relative tax gap in year t, expressed as a percentage;
AR(1) = the autoregressive term; and
Ɛt = stochastic error term.
The expected signs on the coefficients in equation (6) are summarized, as follows:
α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 < 0, α4 > 0, α5 > 0, α6 > 0, α7 > 0

(7)

Naturally, it is the result for coefficient α7 that is of greatest interest to this study (along with, albeit to a
much lesser degree, given the objective of this study, the result for coefficient α1). The data for
computing the tax evasion variable are available in the form of annual data through 2016. Full definitions
of each of the variables considered in this study, along with their respective data sources, are provided
in Table 3.
Table 3. Definitions and Data Sources for Variables
Dependent Variable
Definition and Data Source
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds in year t,
EAR30t
expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017) and
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019)
Explanatory Variables from equation (6)
the ratio of the unified /total nominal federal budget deficit to the nominal GDP
(DEF/GDP)t
in year t, expressed as a percent; Council of Economic Advisors (2002, 2004, 2010,
2013, 2018)
the ratio of the nominal monetary base to the nominal GDP in year t, expressed
(MB/GDP)t
as a percent; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017)
the ratio of the nominal value of net international financial capital inflows to the
(NCI/GDP)t
nominal GDP level in year t, expressed as a percent; Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (2017)
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on three-year U.S Treasury notes in
EAR3YRt
year t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(2017) and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019)
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes in year
EAR10YRt
t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017) and
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019)
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on high grade tax-exempt municipal
EARTFt
bonds in year t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (2017) and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019)
percentage growth rate of real GDP during year t; Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Yt
Louis (2017)
the nominal tax gap in year t, expressed as a percent of nominal GDP in the same
(TAXGAP/GDP)t
year; Ledbetter (2004, 2007), Foertsch (2016), and the Council of Economic
Advisors (2004, 2018)
__________________________________________________
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(PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t
EARBAAt

the ratio of the nominal federal primary budget deficit to the nominal GDP in
year t, expressed as a percent; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017)
the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated interest rate yield in
year t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(2017) and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019)

Descriptive statistics for the all of the variables in equation (6) as well as for those in equations (8), (10),
and (11) for the 1982-2016 study period, are provided in Table 4.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, 1982-2016
Variable
Mean
EAR30
DEF/GDP
MB/GDP
NCI/GDP
EAR3YR
EARTF
Y
TAXGAP/GDP
PRIMARYDEF/GDP
EARBAA

3.402
3.203
85.39
2.62
2.116
2.836
2.686
1.103
0.947
5.292

Standard Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

1.631
2.649
55.05
1.58
2.37
1.142
1.899
0.136
2.96
1.80

7.59
9.80
225.7
5.73
7.17
5.81
7.3
1.325
9.40
10.35

0.69
-2.30
47.6
-0.049
-1.22
1.14
-2.8
0.765
-4.70
2.85

The dependent variable, EAR30t, is contemporaneous with all seven of the explanatory variables in
the model. Accordingly, in order to address potential endogeneity problems, the model is estimated by
auto-regressive two stage least squares (AR/2SLS). The instruments are the two-year lags of each of the
explanatory variables (Hair, et al, 2006; Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2009); interestingly, the adoption of
“more distant” lags, such as three-year lags, on the instruments yields nearly the very similar results and
the very same conclusions (see, e.g., Hair, et al. 2006; Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter 15).

RESULTS OF THE INITIAL AR/2SLS ESTIMATION
Using the model provided in equation (6), the estimation technique adopted in this study involves in part
the AR(1) autoregressive process. This procedure is of interest and relevance and has numerous timesseries applications, with the autoregressive process being arguably best applicable to time-series data
that exhibit more volatile behavior. Examples of the latter would include stock market (equity) indices,
individual stock (equity) prices, and, as is the focus in this study, interest rate yields (Hair, et al., 2006;
Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, the 2SLS estimation is adopted in order to address the potential
simultaneity/endogeneity issues referred to above.
The AR/2SLS estimation of equation (6) is provided in Table 5, where coefficients, standard errors, tvalues, and prob. values can be found, along with other pertinent estimation information, including the
J-statistic. Based on the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test, a heteroscedasticity correction was necessary;
accordingly, the reported results reflect the application of the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity
correction. As shown in Table 5, all seven of the estimated coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs.
Five of these estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, and two are significant at
the 2.5% level. In addition, the J-statistic, which is significant at nearly the 5% level, favorably attests to
the exogeneity of the instrumental variables. Furthermore, the inverted root is -0.21, a value that implies
the estimation involves a stationary autoregressive process.
__________________________________________________
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Table 5. Initial AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Unified Deficit
Dependent Variable: EAR30
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient
Std. Error
TAXGAP/GDP
DEF/GDP
MB/GDP
NCI/GDP
EARTF
EAR3YR
Y
Constant
AR(1)
Inverted AR Root
J-statistic

1.683**
0.167***
-0.007***
-0.1001**
0.0489***
0.306***
0.134***
-0.574
-0.212
-.21
11.35#

0.6437
0.0322
0.0019
0.0367
0.1732
0.1036
0.0269
0.7004

t-statistic

Prob.

2.61
5.20
-3.41
-2.72
2.83
2.95
4.97
-0.82

0.0147
0.0000
0.0021
0.0114
0.0089
0.0066
0.0000
0.4200
0.0780

***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; #statistically significant at the 10% level.

Regarding the control variables, the estimation results imply that the ex ante real interest rate yield
on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds has been an increasing function of both the ex ante real interest rate
yields on three-year Treasury notes (EAR3YR) and high grade municipal bonds (EARTF). The real interest
rate yield on 30-year Treasuries is also shown to have been an increasing function of the percentage
growth rate of real GDP, Y, while being a decreasing function of the monetary base variable, MB/GDP,
and the net international capital inflows variable, NCI/GDP. All of these results are consistent with the
signs hypothesized in Sections 2 and 3.
Attention is now directed at the explanatory variables of principal interest in this study, first and
foremost being the tax evasion variable (TAXGAP/GDP)t and, to a lesser degree, being the budget deficit
variable, (DEF/GDP)t, which can reasonably be regarded as a de facto control variable. Regarding these
two variables, the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds is found to be an increasing
function (at the 2% level) of the relative tax gap variable, (TAXGAP/GDP)t, whereas it is also found to be
an increasing function (at the 1% level) of the unified/total federal budget deficit variable, (DEF/GDP)t.6
Although the latter finding is of interest, of greatest interest and relevance to this study is the heretofore
unexplored outcome implying that the greater the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax
evasion, as measured here by the relative tax gap, the higher the ex ante real market interest rate yield
on 30-year Treasury bonds. This finding vis-à-vis variable (TAXGAP/GDP)t in particular would seem to raise
the very real possibility that personal income tax evasion per se may well contribute to the degree of
crowding out, an issue heretofore associated typically only with government budget deficits per se
(Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cecchetti, 2006, p. 562; Madura, 2008, pp. 34, 106; Cebula, 2018).

AN ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: THE PRIMARY BUDGET DEFICIT
In order to provide further potential insight into the impact of income tax evasion on the long-term real
Treasury bond yield, we next estimate an alternative specification of the model shown in equation (6)
and described in (7). Specifically, the new specification [(8) and (9) below] differs from the original model
considered above insofar as it includes, in place of the unified/total deficit, the primary federal budget
__________________________________________________
6 The latter finding, like that shown in Table 5, is consistent at least in principle with several prior studies of interest rate yields
(of varying maturities) and federal budget deficits for earlier time periods (e.g., Hoelscher, 1986; Swamy, Kolluri, and
Singamsetti, 1990; Cebula, 2018).
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deficit, (PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t, which is the unified/total budget deficit minus net interest payments by the
Treasury. Accordingly, the new model to be estimated, which excludes the interaction term between the
primary budget deficit and the relative tax gap, which was found once again to be statistically
insignificant (Wooldridge, 2009), is provided in equation (8):7
EAR30t = b0 + b1 (PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t + b2 (MB/GDP)t + b3 (NCI/GDP)t + b4 EAR3YRt +
b5 EARTFt + b6 Yt + b7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t + b8 AR(1) + Ɛt ‘

(8)

The hypothesized signs on the coefficients in equation (8) are, as follows:
b1 > 0, b2 < 0, b3 < 0, b4 > 0, b5 > 0, b6 > 0, b7 > 0

(9)

Once again, it is the finding for coefficient b7 that is of greatest interest to this study.
The AR/2SLS estimation of equation (8) is provided in Table 6. As shown, all of the estimated
coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs, with five being significant at the 1% level, one being
significant at the 2.5% level, and one being significant at the 5% level. The J-statistic, which is significant at
beyond the 5% level, attests very favorably to the exogeneity of the instruments. The AR root is -0.17,
which implies the estimation involves a stationary autoregressive process. The estimation results imply,
among other things, that EAR30t is an increasing function of EAR3YRt, EARTFt, and Yt, while being a
decreasing function of both (MB/GDP)t and (NCI/GDP)t. In addition, EAR30t is found to be an increasing
function of the primary federal budget deficit-to-GDP variable.
Table 6. Alternative AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Primary Deficit
Dependent Variable: EAR30
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient
Std. Error
TAXGAP/GDP
DEF/GDP
MB/GDP
NCI/GDP
EARTF
EAR3YR
Y
Constant
AR(1)
Inverted AR Root
J-statistic

1.279*
0.128***
-0.006***
-0.1189**
0.592***
0.292***
0.152***
-0.028
-0.134
-.13
14.21*

0.5748
0.0259
0.0018
0.0447
0.1434
0.0900
0.0323
0.4860

t-statistic

Prob.

2.22
4.95
-3.41
-2.66
4.13
3.24
4.70
-0.06

0.0350
0.0000
0.0042
0.0132
0.0003
0.0032
0.0001
0.9551
0.0476

***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; # statistically significant at the 10% level.

Furthermore, and most relevant to the objective of this study, there is the empirical finding
summarized in Table 6 that the greater the relative tax gap, the higher the real interest rate yield on 30year Treasury bonds.8 This estimation result, like that in Table 5, would seem to imply the existence of an
income-tax-evasion induced crowding out. Once again, it is observed that this interest rate impact
attributable expressly to the relative tax gap measure of personal income tax evasion is unique among
studies of U.S. Treasury yields and studies of U.S. income tax evasion.
__________________________________________________
7 The

instruments in this estimation are the two-year lags of the explanatory variables in equation (8).
estimating equations (6) and (8) using “more distant lags,” , e.g., three-year lags, on the instruments (as
suggested in Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter 15, p. 23) in the potential presence of auto-correlated errors, yielded the same
conclusions as we have inferred from Tables 5 and 6. Indeed, the outcomes shown in Tables 7 and 8 reflect instruments with
three-year lags.

8 Interestingly,
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FURTHER INQUIRY: MOODY’S BAA-RATED CORPORATE BOND YIELDS
Tables 5 and 6 provide empirical evidence supportive of the relative tax gap hypothesis in terms of the
ex ante real interest rate yield on long-term, i.e., 30 year Treasury bonds. In this section, we inquire
whether there is evidence that the relative tax gap also exerts upward pressure on the yield for longterm corporate bond issues. More specifically, the empirical investigation summarized in this section
of the study addresses whether the hypothesis in question applies to say, the ex ante real interest rate
yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, EARBAA. Paralleling the analysis underlying Tables 5 and
6, it is hypothesized that the upward pressure from the relative tax gap on the ex ante real interest
rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds will also, through competition in the financial markets (Carlson and
Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1994; Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken, 2012), exert upward pressure on
private sector longer-term corporate yields, such as the EARBAA.
Accordingly, we investigate this hypothesis by estimating the following two equations by AR/2SLS:
EARBAAt = c0 + c1 (DEF/GDP)t + c2 (MB/GDP)t + c3 (NCI/GDP)t + c4 EAR3YRt + c5 EARTFt
+ c6 Yt + c7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t + c8 AR(1) + Ɛt”

(10)

EARBAAt = d0 + d1 (PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t + d2 (MB/GDP)t + d3 (NCI/GDP)t + d4 EAR3YRt
+ d5 EARTFt + d6 Yt + d7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t + d8 AR(1) + Ɛt “’

(11)

The estimates of equations (10) and (11) are provided in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. As shown in Table
7, the J-statistic is significant at the 5% level, implying exogeneity of the lagged instrumental variables
(lag=3), and the autoregressive root (-.31) indicates a stable autoregressive process. In Table 7, it also is
revealed that the relative tax gap is found to exercise a positive and statistically significant (at the 4%
level) impact on the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds.
This result is entirely compatible with its counterparts in Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, as shown in Table
8, where the primary budget deficit is considered in place of the unified deficit, there is further evidence
that the relative tax gap exercises a statistically significant (at the 2% level) positive impact on the real
Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield.
Table 7. New AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Unified Deficit
Dependent Variable: EARBAA
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient
Std. Error
TAXGAP/GDP
DEF/GDP
MB/GDP
NCI/GDP
EARTF
EAR3YR
Y
Constant
AR(1)
Inverted AR Root
J-statistic

2.528*
0.162#
-0.006*
-0.1283#
0.763**
0.283
-0.162
0.224
-0.314
-.31
14.24#

0.9958
0.0839
0.0026
0.0752
0.3021
0.1755
0.0607
0.9936

t-statistic

Prob.

2.27
1.93
-2.28
-1.71
2.53
1.61
-1.08
0.22

0.0320
0.0642
0.0309
0.1000
0.0180
0.1193
0.2891
0.8268
0.0470

***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; *statistically significant at the 5% level; #
statistically significant at the 10% level.
__________________________________________________
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Table 8. New AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Primary Deficit
Dependent Variable: EARBAA
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient
Std. Error
TAXGAP/GDP
PRIMARYDEF/GDP
MB/GDP
NCI/GDP
EARTF
EAR3YR
Y
Constant
AR(1)
Inverted AR Root
J-statistic

3.058*
0.135#
-0.006***
-0.1317
1.016***
0.211
-0.059
-0.543
0.066
.07
12.19#

0.9320
0.0715
0.0020
0.0811
0.3414
0.1533
0.0534
0.8853

t-statistic

Prob.

2.50
1.89
-2.94
-1.62
2.98
1.37
-1.12
-0.61

0.0191
0.0697
0.0068
0.1166
0.0062
0.1808
0.2719
0.5445
0.0943

***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; *statistically significant at the 5% level; #
statistically significant at the 10% level.

CONCLUSION
The principal objective of this exploratory study is to empirically investigate the relative tax gap
hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, the higher the relative tax gap, the higher the real interest rate yield
on 30 year U.S. Treasury bonds. The potential impact of federal personal income tax evasion in the
form of the relative tax gap per se on ex ante real Treasury debt (or, for that matter, on long-term
corporate debt) interest rate yields has not heretofore been explored in either the income tax evasion
literature or the interest rate literature.
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the AR/2SLS estimations find that higher values of the relative tax gap
measure of income tax evasion elevate the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds.9
According to the conventional wisdom (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1994; Haubrich, Pennacchi,
and Ritchken, 2012), this upward pressure from the relative tax gap on the ex ante real interest rate
yield on 30-year Treasury bonds would in theory also, through competition in the financial markets,
exert upward pressure on longer-term corporate interest rates as well. It is not surprising then, as
shown in Tables 7 and 8, that there is also empirical evidence that the larger the relative tax gap, the
higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds. Separately
as well as in combination, these findings raise the possibility that income tax evasion in the form of the
relative tax gap may well contribute, by raising real interest rates, to the crowding out of private sector
investment in new plant and equipment most commonly associated with federal government budget
deficits per se (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cecchetti, 2006, p. 562; Madura, 2008, pp. 34, 106; Cebula,
2018). Hence, the empirical results suggest the existence of a “tax-evasion-induced crowding out effect.”
Accordingly, it would seem that policymakers and politicians could better serve the public good if
they were more and better informed and, correspondingly, more efficiently proactive in taking steps to
reduce federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S. To the extent that new or modified public policies
are implemented and are successful in curbing the degree of personal income tax evasion, there
arguably is reason to believe that the upward pressure on long-term ex ante real interest rates might
__________________________________________________

Furthermore, although it is not the central focus of this project, the empirical findings imply that, even in the explicit
presence of income tax evasion, the greater the federal budget deficit, whether measured as the total/unified deficit as a
percent of GDP or as the primary budget deficit as a percent of GDP, the higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year
Treasury bonds as well.

9
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very well be alleviated and, furthermore, that the growth rate of the national debt could be diminished.
Needless to say, further empirical research regarding the issues considered in this study is necessary in
order to establish confidence in the relative tax gap hypothesis. Indeed, more elaborate modeling and
more sophisticated econometrics are two obvious paths for subsequent related future research;
furthermore, a longer study period and a possible refocus on ex post real or nominal interest rates may
yield interesting and useful results.

__________________________________________________
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